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Beginning in June of 2010 an environmental mystery was unfolding on the International Space Station (ISS). 
The U.S. Water Processor Assembly (WPA) began to produce water with increasing levels of total organic 
carbon (TOC).  A surprisingly consistent upward TOC trend was observed through weekly in-flight total 
organic carbon analyzer (TOCA) monitoring.  As TOC is a general organics indicator, return of water 
archive samples was needed to make better-informed crew health decisions and to aid in WPA 
troubleshooting.  TOCA-measured TOC was more than halfway to its health-based screening limit before 
archive samples could be returned on Soyuz 22 and analyzed. 
 
Although TOC was confirmed to be elevated, somewhat surprisingly, none of the typical target compounds 
were the source.  After some solid detective work, it was confirmed that the TOC was associated with a 
compound known as dimethylsilanediol (DMSD).    DMSD is believed to be a breakdown product of silicon-
containing compounds present on ISS.  A toxicological limit was set for DMSD and a forward plan developed 
for operations given this new understanding of the source of the TOC.   This required extensive coordination 
with ISS stakeholders and innovative use of available in-flight and archive monitoring resources.  Behind the 
numbers and scientific detail surrounding this anomaly, there exists a compelling story of multi-disciplinary 
awareness, teamwork, and important environmental lessons learned. 
Nomenclature 
DMSD = dimethylsilanediol 
ECLSS = environmental control and life support system 
ISS = International Space Station 
JSC = Johnson Space Center 
MSFC =   Marshall Space Flight Center 
PPB =   parts per billion 
TOC = total organic carbon 
TOCA = total organic carbon analyzer 
WAFAL = Water and Food Analytical Laboratory 
WPA = water processor assembly 
I. Introduction 
n some ways, the challenges that unfolded in June-November of 2010 represented a “perfect storm” for the 
conscientious scientists and engineers charged with protecting crew health on-board the International Space 
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Station (ISS).   In-flight monitoring was clearly indicating a steadily-rising chemical pollutant in the potable water 
produced by the U.S. Water Processor Assembly (WPA).    There was no longer a concern as to whether the trend 
was real or not;  the questions at hand were “What is causing it?”, “Does it pose a health risk?”, and “How can we 
mitigate it?”.   But to effectively answer these questions, one needed to first know the identity of the chemical, and 
several uncertain months and many unbridgeable miles still waited ahead of that identification that could only be 
enabled by ground analysis of returned archive water samples.  
 
For all those involved, these were clearly challenging times.  Of course, it is said that with every challenge there are 
also opportunities to expand knowledge, to test preparedness, to erase misconceptions, and to prepare for the future.  
This paper is intended to highlight and discuss those opportunities afforded by the events related to the unexpected 
appearance and disappearance of a chemical pollutant in U.S. potable water on-board the ISS in 2010.  One reason 
the story is worth telling is that it highlights the practical challenges involved in integration of environmental 
monitoring tools in decision making within the current spaceflight operational paradigm.  While technical events 
and findings are discussed, there is a focus on lessons learned.  This paper highlights existing strengths, warns of 
potential vulnerabilities, and attempts to tell the richer and more challenging story that exists beyond the black-and-
white world of data points, fault trees, and response action plans.              
 
II. Event Description 
A.  Background 
On-orbit checkout of the U.S. Water Processor Assembly (WPA) was completed in 2008, which allowed for the 
treatment and recycling of urine distillate and ISS humidity condensate as potable water.   This was a critical ISS 
milestone, as the recovered water was essential to sustain 6 crew operations.  Despite the advanced treatment 
technologies that were designed into WPA, potential chemical and microbial risks associated with consumption of 
recycled water remain.   For chemical constituents, those residual risks are, to a large degree, mitigated through 
environmental monitoring and analysis. 
 
Environmental monitoring on ISS consists of both: (A) ground laboratory analysis of archive water samples 
returned on Shuttle or Soyuz vehicles1, and (B) in-flight monitoring technologies (Figure 1).  JSC Water and Food 
Analytical Laboratory (WAFAL) scientists nominally arrange for monthly archive potable water samples to be 
collected from the WPA.    The return of these 500-1000 mL samples depends on the schedule of Shuttle or Soyuz 
visitations to ISS, and whether there is available down mass.     
 
The primary in-flight water monitoring technique is the total organic carbon analyzer (TOCA)2.  Total organic 
carbon (TOC) is a general chemical indicator of the overall load of organic compounds in a water sample.  The 
relative ease and non-selective nature of TOC analysis offers advantages in the context of remote spaceflight 
monitoring, although the disadvantage is that the analysis can’t distinguish what organic chemical is contributing the 
TOC.  Through professional judgment as to the types of compounds likely to be seen in a recycled water system, it 
was possible to set a health-based screening limit for TOC based on a “reasonable worst-case” compound.   A TOC 
screening limit of 3000 parts per billion (ppb) was set by the NASA-Johnson Space Center (JSC) Toxicology Group 
working in conjunction with the National Research Council.  The limit was established to be specific to recycled 
water systems, based on the assumption that a compound similar in toxicity to formaldehyde might be the entire 
source of the TOC3.  Flight rules, hazard reports, and procedures were also established such that the recycled water 
from the WPA could be consumed as long as the TOC was monitored with TOCA, and TOC readings were below 
3000 ppb.  Consumption of water with higher TOC levels would necessitate more detailed stakeholder review and 
risk assessment.  
 
From the initiation of consumption of WPA water in May of 2009, there was little cause for concern in regard to 
the quality of water produced by the WPA.   TOC levels were consistently below the TOCA method detection limit 
(475 ppb) whenever the weekly TOCA sessions were completed.  These mundane findings were further confirmed 
by returning archive water samples.  In fact, some stakeholders asked if less frequent TOCA monitoring was 
justified given the lack of apparent issues.    The irony is that the amount of data and experience gained during these 
nominal time periods ultimately made the events that would unfold starting in June 2010 all the more prominent and 
actionable.    
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Figure 1:  In-flight (TOCA) and Archive Water Monitoring on ISS 
   
 
B. Rise in TOC 
The first indication of a water quality change came when the TOCA recorded an unexpected TOC jump for 
WPA product water on June 15, 2010 (see Figure 2).   JSC Space Life Sciences Directorate staff was vigilant, but 
recognized that the measured levels were still below the method detection limit for TOCA and were somewhat 
uncertain.  Nevertheless, a consistent weekly rise in TOCA results quickly made it clear that this was the start of a 
trend.   With each weekly sample, specialists watched as the TOC steadily climbed.   By July, staff self-consciously 
joked that the “straight-line” trend charts looked almost contrived, as environmental samples rarely adhered to that 
type of regularity.   Increasing at 100-200 ppb each week, TOC was a third of the way to the 3000 ppb health-based 
limit by mid-July and half-way to this limit by Labor Day.  Anomaly resolution teams were formed and fault trees 
were generated.   Unfortunately, there would be no easy answers despite the best intended coordination.  Initial data 
did not suggest changes in airborne volatiles on ISS that might make their way into condensate that feeds WPA.  In 
late July, Environmental Control and Life Support Specialists (ECLSS) changed out critical multi-filtration systems, 
and everyone crossed their fingers, only to be disappointed by minimal impacts to the continuing upward TOC 
trend.         
 
Questions were raised by some about whether the TOCA readings were accurate.   After all, the internal WPA 
catalytic reactor health sensors that were designed to detect these types of anomalies had only responded once in 
early June, and were not indicating a continuing water quality challenge.   Several successful TOCA calibration 
checks helped address these questions, although returned archive samples were really needed to verify the TOC rise 
and identify the chemical or chemicals that were responsible.   Indeed, it was thought that many answers would 
ultimately be provided by the archive air, condensate, and product water samples that unfortunately remained on 
ISS, awaiting a late September return on Soyuz 22.  Until that point, all stakeholders could really do was theorize, 
plan, trend, and wait.    
C. Return of the Archive Samples  
Soyuz 22 samples arrived at the WAFAL laboratory at JSC in late September 2010.  Archive samples were 
analyzed for over 300 different chemical parameters.   Analysts worked diligently to get sample results as quickly as 
possible given the implications for the rising TOC trend.  One important initial confirmation from the ground 
analysis results was that TOC was indeed elevated in the WPA product water samples.  While the ground analysis 
TOC data was approximately 25% higher than in-flight TOCA data for the same approximate time points, this was 
not unexpected for a field method that must be able to address a broad array of potential TOC contributors.   What 
was encouraging was that the archives clearly showed that TOCA served as an excellent trending tool during this 
event, and rises and dips in TOCA-reported TOC data could be accepted without reservation.  
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Figure 2:  TOC Trending in WPA product water per TOCA in 2010 
 
 
 
The story took an unexpected twist when the full analytical results were reviewed and no individual organic 
compounds were detected at significant levels in the product water.  Clearly, since the TOC was verified to be high, 
this meant that there were non-standard analyte(s) that remained uncharacterized.   Several weeks of solid analytical 
detective work by a number of dedicated professionals at JSC and MSFC led to the ultimate identification of the 
unknown as dimethylsilanediol (DMSD)4.  DMSD and associated dimers were found to account for the vast 
majority (>90%) of the TOC in the WPA product water samples (refer to Table 1).  DMSD is a compound that is 
often seen as a degradation product of other silicon-based organic compounds (see Figure  3). Silicon-containing 
compounds (either in the form of polydimethylsiloxanes or volatile methylsiloxanes) are ubiquitous on ISS, whether 
as sealants, lubricating oils, or additives to a myriad of hygiene products, medications, and payloads.  DMSD was 
found in the WPA feed water/condensate samples returned on Soyuz 22, as well as in the potable samples.   One 
perplexing aspect was that further analysis of older (2009-2010) ISS condensate and feed water samples indicated 
DMSD was not a new challenge to the WPA in terms of feed water, but did not appear in prior product water 
samples. 
        Figure 3: Structure of dimethylsilanediol (DMSD) 
 
 
An evaluation by JSC Toxicologists concluded that oral exposures to DMSD in drinking water posed a low-to-
moderate toxicological concern for spaceflight crews.   Accordingly, an interim exposure limit for drinking water 
was set at 25,000 ppb (TOC equivalent of 6500 ppb).  This limit was set to protect against the potential for exposure 
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to DMSD to result in nervous system impairment and other adverse health effects.  Fortunately, DMSD in WPA 
product water was reported at a maximum of ~8000 ppb (Table 1).  
    
Now that the identity of the TOC contributor was known, practical operational planning was needed to address 
the reality of an elevated TOC baseline.  As mentioned previously, TOCA was shown to underpredict actual TOC 
when the contributing compound was DMSD.  In order to accurately track TOC and DMSD levels, a somewhat 
novel blending of in-flight and archive monitoring resources was implemented.  Archive sample results were used to 
“baseline” known levels of TOC/DMSD for a certain date, while TOCA data were used to estimate weekly changes 
from that baseline.  Following this approach, current TOC/DMSD levels could be accurately predicted despite the 
known off-set between in-flight and archive measurements (see Table 2). 
 
Another very real concern in proceeding with operations was the potential for elevated TOCA-reported TOC to 
“mask” other unknown contaminants from a risk assessment perspective.  In other words, the high TOC might be 
assumed to consist of only DMSD, whereas other organics might also be present in the product water.   
Unknowingly, these operational concerns were about to be mitigated through a strange twist to this story that 
unfolded in October of 2010. 
D. An Unexplained TOC Drop 
Given the mysterious rise in TOC/DMSD levels in June of 2010, perhaps it was fitting that it would disappear 
just as dramatically.   From a Soyuz-returned archive sample, it is now known that a “high water mark” for TOC of 
2500 ppb (8000 ppb of DMSD) was reached around October 19th (refer to Table 1 for a complete listing of archive 
TOC/DMSD levels for pertinent samples).   Unexpectedly, the October 21st in-flight TOCA reading dropped around 
25% from the previous week, and successive TOCA samples recorded a similar linear decrease each week, with 
TOCA returning to its pre-anomaly baseline by mid November (see Figure 2).   In actuality, the TOCA drop may 
have even occurred over a much quicker timeframe, as the three TOCA replicates performed with each sampling 
session became very disparate in conjunction with the TOC decline.   It is theorized that quickly diminishing DMSD 
concentrations in conjunction with sample carryover between the weekly analyses might cause this type of analytical 
confounding, though recent ground testing of TOCA has not offered proof of this theory.   While the rate of TOC 
drop may remain an unanswered question, the archive sample collected from the WPA product water on November 
23rd confirmed no detectable levels of DMSD and a return to nominal TOC levels for the first time since June 2010.    
 
While stakeholders were obviously thrilled that the DMSD was mitigated, there was some trepidation over the 
fact that the root cause of both its appearance and disappearance remained unresolved.    Perhaps one JSC scientist 
expressed these mixed feelings best in remarking, “We are really excited about the results!  We just don’t know why 
we are excited”.  Engineering staff had made both minor and major WPA system adjustments soon after the TOC 
rise was observed, and none of them had altered the consistent TOC rise to any real extent.   A change in the WPA 
catalytic reactor temperature was made in late September, but seemingly to no avail.   Only recently has evidence 
become available suggesting that trends in at least one silicon-containing chemical within the ISS atmosphere 
closely correlate with the changes observed in TOC/DMSD.   The exact role of any of these factors remains an 
active area of investigation.   As of the time of this manuscript, stakeholders are awaiting a large number of archives 
that will return from ISS on STS-133/ULF5.  It is hoped that those samples will help fill in gaps in the story of the 
TOC anomaly of 2010, and will ultimately lead to a fuller understanding of the ISS environment in regard to these 
types of multi-disciplinary challenges.  
 
Table 1:  TOC and DMSD data from selected 2010 archive samples returned from ISS 
Sample Date TOC (ppb) DMSD (ppb) 
WPA Product Water Sample 7/14/2010 1510 6100 
WPA Product Water Sample*  7/29/2010 2180 7300 
WPA Product Water Sample 8/25/2010 2190 8200 
WPA Product Water Sample** 9/15/2010 1100 4700 
WPA Product Water Sample 10/19/2010 2510 8000 
WPA Product Water Sample 11/23/2010 150 Not Detected (<2000) 
*Collected from WPA potable water dispenser, but prior to finishing where additional activated carbon/ion exchange occurs.   
**Sample was collected just after dispenser activated carbon filter changeout, which resulted in very brief drop in TOC/DMSD.   
TOCA confirmed that elevated levels returned within a week. 
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Table 2:  Example of Approach for Integrated TOCA and Archive Data To Predict Future DMSD Levels 
 
              
III. Conclusion and Lessons Learned 
While responding to the 2010 TOC anomaly was often challenging, tedious, and stressful, it also led to 
professional growth, greater interdisciplinary cooperation, and heightened scientific understanding of the ISS 
environment.   Additionally, a few “lessons learned” were identified that, if heeded, might better position NASA to 
meet future operational challenges regarding the ISS environment.  
 
1. Monitoring Is A Good Thing, Even if You Find Nothing. 
Environmental monitoring, especially in the context of a remote and extreme environment requires major 
time and resource commitments.  After a long time of monitoring and finding that nothing is out of the 
ordinary, it is quite logical to ask whether this activity is necessary at its prescribed frequency.  This TOC 
anomaly highlighted the importance of having good insight into the environment under nominal conditions.    
Experience in monitoring during nominal operations allows one to more quickly separate trend from noise.  
It also provides context, which is crucial for influencing stakeholder opinion to act upon monitoring data 
when necessary. 
 
2. Archive and In-Flight Monitoring Are Important and Complementary. 
The TOC anomaly highlighted the strengths and weaknesses of both archive and in-flight monitoring, but 
more importantly it allowed for a demonstration of ways that the two can be used in tandem to tackle 
environmental challenges. Without a doubt, the TOCA proved to be a valuable and reliable screening tool 
that allowed us to make the right decisions regarding crew health and ISS water quality.  However, despite 
the practical necessities (e.g., decreasing archive sample return opportunities from ISS with loss of Shuttle) 
and technological advancements (e.g. miniaturization) that favor the rise of in-flight techniques, it is not 
foreseeable that long-term crew habitation decisions can be effectively made in the total absence of archive 
return.   It will always be important to confirm what you think you already know through full laboratory 
analysis of archive samples. With the TOC anomaly, even if there were in-flight techniques for all the 
typical compounds of concern, DMSD would have remained unaddressed.   Though one might argue that, 
over time, system knowledge and in-flight capabilities will increase, experience tells us that there will 
always be something unanticipated (i.e., there will always be another DMSD).  
 
3. Allowing for “Margin” is Critical to Success. 
One aspect of the story that might be taken for granted is the amount of analytical margin (and associated 
response time) between the identification of the rising TOC trend and the established health-based decision 
point for TOC.  During this period, stakeholders were able to attempt to troubleshoot and mitigate the 
system, return diagnostic archive samples, refine health-based standards, and develop operational plans.  In 
part, this was fortuitous, as the TOC rise was relatively slow.   An inherent rise of 1000 ppb/week, for 
example, would have afforded little time for response and planning, and might have forced inaccurate and 
conservative decisions regarding ISS water safety.  To a significant extent, however, it should be recognized 
8/25/10 DMSD could be 
predicted by knowing the 
7/14/10 archive DMSD 
and the TOCA delta. 
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that this margin was enabled by having a reliable in-flight monitor on-board ISS.  Without this tool, minor 
chaos would have ensued when the archive samples returning on Soyuz showed the totally unforeseen 
appearance of a significant unknown.   Moreover, having an in-flight instrument that was sensitive enough 
to detect a changing environment early-on was critical.  The TOCA method detection limit (475 ppb) was a 
full six fold lower than the health-based screening limit of 3000 ppb.  This observation should serve as a 
prompt to the developers of future monitoring hardware to allow for as much analytical margin as possible 
relative to action levels.  When faced with cost trades, it is prudent to spend more development dollars to 
achieve operational margin.  A profound truth is that it is too late to purchase response time when you find 
yourself in need of it. 
 
4. Expect the Unexpected. 
Consider the following observations. The WPA was thoroughly ground-tested, and was subjected to an 
extensive on-orbit checkout period prior to crew consumption of the water without similar incident. The 
TOC rise was contrary to nearly two years of nominal on-orbit operations of the WPA. The contributor to 
the TOC (DMSD) was not on the target analyte list for ISS.  Controls inherent to the WPA (conductivity 
sensors) did not consistently indicate contaminant breakthrough.   Finally, DMSD disappeared from potable 
water despite all expectations that it would continue upward.   Despite the best intentions, the most 
comprehensive plans, the clearest fault trees, and the most logical hypotheses, the unexpected still happens.  
A wise response to this reality is to incorporate redundancy in designs, to plan for failures that may never 
occur, to be willing to expand your perspectives, and to continually seek out lessons to learn.  
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